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THE COURT B.ELOW ERRED BY DENYING
THE DEFENSE" .S MOTION "TO DISMISS
THE COMPLAIN!T OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR
THE REASON 'FHAT THE COMPLAINT AS
PREPARED,
THE EVIDENCE AS
PRESENTED TO THE COURT, FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A !PRIMA FACIE CASE IN
THAT THERE \tfAS NO EVIDENCE WHICH
WOULD JUSTIFY THE COURT
THAT
TIME 1
THE EVIDENCE MOST
FAVORABLY TO MR.
WITH
ANY INTENT TO DO BODILY HAPJ1 TO MRS.

(R. 91, 92, 136).

II.

THE DEFINIT':ION OF "CONSIDERABLE
PROVOCATION"' GIVEN IN INSTRUCTION
NO. 8 AS "TEIE EXISTENCE OF FACTS
OR
AS WOULD CAUSE A
REASONABLE A.ND PRUDENT PERSON UNDER
LIKE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWN
BY THE EVIDENCE TO EXERCISE AN UNCONTROLLABLE RAGE, FEAR, ANXIETY,
OR EXCI'l'EMEf.JT, SO THAT HE ACTS SOLEL)
lJNDER AND BY REASON OF SUCH RAGE,
FEAR,
I
OR EXCITEMENT I
REASONABLY INDUCED BY SUCH PROVOCATION" IS DEFECTIVE.

-

l

-

III.

INSTRUCTION NO. 8 DOES NOT FAIRLY
AND ACCUIZATELY REPRESENT THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN 'l'HE CASE, IN THAT
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN ABANDONED OR MALIGNANT HEART
UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GIVING OF
THIS PARTICULAR INSTRUCTION WAS
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE
POSITION AND CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

IV.

THE EVIDENCE AS RECEIVED BY THE
BELOW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AS
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN UNLAWFUL
ATTEMPT.

V.

INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS CONFUSING AND
DOES NOT CORRECTLY AND ACCURATELY
STATE THE OBLIGATION OF THE JURY IN
DETERMINING THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE
OF THE DEFENDANT, AND MERELY STATES
THAT THE JURY IS TO FIRST DETERMINE
THE GUILT OF THE CRIME OF ASSAULT
WITH A DEADLY WEAPON WITH INTENT TO
DO BODILY HARM. THIS INSTRUCTION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREFACED WITH AN
INSTRUCTION OR OBSERVATION THAT THE
DEFENDANT AT ALL TIMES IS PRESUMED
TO BE INNOCENT OF THE CRIME IN ANY
DETERMINATION OR DELIBERATION BY THE
JURY.
THE INSTRUCTION, AS GIVEN,
IS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND CONTRARY
TO LAW.

CONCLUSION .
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- 4 STATEMENT OF 'l'HE NATURE OF THE CASE
AND LlISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW
Appellant, Wallace Dunnivan, is
appealing from a conviction of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to
do bodily harm pursuant to which
Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate period of not more than five
years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order remanding
the case for new trial with supplemental
instructions to avoid the prejudicial
errors which occurred in the original
proceeding.
STATEMENT OF .l'-li\TERIAL FACTS
We learn from the record that

alt.hough the defendant, Wallace Dunnivan,

-

r-

-

and the complaining witness, Peggy
Dunnivan, had previously been divorced,
they were living together as man and
wife at the time of the incident of
October 3, 1970, with which we are concerned here (R. 12, 18-21, 94-95).

In

fact, they had slept together and had
marital relations the night before
(R.

18, 99).
During the preceeding week, first

a truck and then the car which the
Dunnivans were buying together were
repossessed by the respective banks
holding the chattel mortgages on the
vehicles because the Dunnivan's had
failed to make the payments when due
(R • 18 I

96 I

97)

•

1

Dunn1'van claimed

the repossession of the truck and car
greatly angered him as he had given
Mrs. Dunnivan sufficient money with

- 6 which to make the payments and had no
idea that the payments had not been
made.

He claims she never even bothered

to inform him that the payments were
past due until after the vehicles had
been repossessed.

In fact, he claims

he was taking a n?-p when the car was
repossessed the afternoon of October 2,
1970, and that Mrs. Dunnivan did not
even bother to wake him to tell him what
was happening.

He claims that between

the two of them they had sufficient
money right then to have made up the
back payments and save the car from being
repossessed.

He claims such irresponsible

inaction by Mrs. Dunnivan caused him to
feel outrageous toward her (R. 96-99).
The fact that they argued October 2,
1970, about the repossession of the
vehic:les was admitted by Mrs. Dunnivan
(FL

18).

-

7 -

Mr. Dunnivan claimed that the
morning after the argument about the
vehicles being repossessed he went to
a business meeting where he received
phone calls from various creditors seeking
payment for past due bills (R. 100).
Learning that there were other creditors
who had not been paid further angered
him.

That evening he returned home

with a business associate and his wife,
Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins, who had agreed to
take the Dunnivans to Provo to pay their
creditors.

The associate and his wife

remained in the car while Mr. Dunnivan
went in to talk to Mrs. Dunnivan.

He

informed her that the creditors were
seeking payment and asked her how much
money she had.

She replied that she had

a hundred dollars in the bank.

He then

told her to go down town with the

-

8 -

Jenkins and cash a check for the hundred
dollars while he took a shower.

When

she got back they were to go to Provo
to pay each of the creditors some of
the money (R. 101-103).
As Mr. Dunnivan was looking in a
chest of drawers for clean underwear
before taking his shower, he found a
loaded sawed-off 12-gage shotgun (R. 103).
Then in Mr. Dunnivan's own words
as found on page 104 of the record:
I am so mad now that I
am fixing to blow my stack,
because that gun was in the
second drawer and I got all
little kids like that, and it
was loaded. Anyone of those
kids could have killed themselves or killed one of the
others.
I was so mad I
couldn't see straight, and I
set there at that table and
waited until she got through,
until she got back.
Mr.

Dunnivan claims he intended .to

confront his wife with the loaded shot

- 9 gun when she returned and ask her why
she would leave such a dangerous instrument within reach of their small children.
As she and her father, Mr. Davis, walked
in the door he picked up the gun intending
to ask her about it and show her father
what a "stupid daughter he had with
that shot gun"

(R. 106).

Mr. Dunnivan

claimed he resented his former fatherin-law because throughout his marriage
to Mrs. Dunnivan she would run to her
father every time she could not have
her way and he would interfere, threatenin
"to work me over 11 with judo (R. 106).
Before Mr. Dunnivan had an opportunity to ask Mrs. Dunnivan why she had
lcf t the loaded shot gun in reach of the
small children, Mr. Davis asked him
"Did you threaten my daughter?"

(R. 109) ·

Then quoting further from page 109 of

- 10 the record:
And I said, 'Yes, I did.'
And he says, 'Did you threaten
to kill her?' and I said, 'No,
but I should have.'
At this point Mr. Dunnivan saw
the police officers come in and laid
the shot gun down on the table.

The

officers handcuffed him and took him
in to jail (R. 109-110).
Mr. Dunnivan claimed he never had
his hand on the trigger at any time
during this incident (R. 110) .
He also claims that the shot gun
was given to Mrs. Dunnivan by a George
Kinsey who found it at the Provo City
dump ( R. 10 8) .
Mrs. Dunnivan admitted she and
Mr. Dunnivan argued about the repossession of their vehicles but denied that
they argued about the other bills when
he came home the evening of October 3,

- 11 1970.

She claims he demanded the hundred

dollars so he could go drinking (R. 23).
She and her illegitimate daughter, Merlene,
testified that he said if she did not
get the money he would kill her (R. 23,
65).

Mrs. Dunnivan denied that the

shot gun was hers or that it was in the
dresser drawer (R. 27).

She claimed

she saw his finger on the trigger (R. 38)
but none of the other witnesses could.
testify that he had his finger on the
trigger (R. 56, 75, 89).
Mrs. Dunnivan first claimed that
Mr. Dunnivan turned the gun towards her
and her father and that if it had gone
off it would have gotten both of them
(R. 37).

Later she testified that it

would have struck her and the two
officers but not her father (R. 41) .
When asked at whow

the gun was pointed,

- 12 --

Mr. Davis answered, "It would be closest

to Officer Hales" (R. 5 4) •

When asked,

"He never got the gun past Officer
Hales who was down on the end, is that
right?", Mr. Davis answered, "That's
right."

Mr. Davis was next asked,

"He

never got it over towards your daughter
or towards Officer Hales at all that
you remember?"
I grabbed it"

He answered, "No, because
(R. 57).

When Officer Hazel was asked, "Did
the gun that Mr. Dunnivan brought up
off the floor ever get as far as M.r:s.
Dunnivan?

Was it ever at any time

pointed in her direction?", He answered,
"He never got a chance to get that far,
to my knowledge"

(R. 81).

When asked,

"Did you ever see the gun at any time
pointed in the direction of Mrs. Dunnivan?"
Officer Hales answered, "No"

(R. 89} ·

- 13 Officer Hazel also testified that the
gun was not cocked (R. 82).

Officer

Hales testified that Mr. Davis was
behind Mr. Dunnivan when he slapped
the gun down (R. 86, 87).

Mr. Davis

and Officer Hazel testified Mr. Davis
was to the right of Mr. Dunnivan (R. 52,
74).

All witnesses agreed that Mr.

Dunnivan remained seated until the gun
was taken away from him (R. 35, 52, 79,
90).

Both Mr. and Mrs. Dunnivan

testified that Mr. Dunnivan is righthanded (R. 38, 122).

Mr. Dunnivan

picked the gun up off the floor with
his left hand (R. 36, 51, 89).
Just what Mr. Dunnivan said between
the time Mr. Davis, Mrs. Dunnivan and
the Police officers entered the house
and the time the shot gun was taken
a\-J<!Y

from him is not clear.

Mrs.

- 14 Dunnivan testified on direct examination
that, "We went in the house and my father
says,

'Did you threaten my daughter?'

and he said,

'Yes. '"

When instructed

at this point to speak louder, she said,
"My father asked him if he had threatened
me, and he said 'Yes'"

(R. 15).

On

cross examination Mrs. Dunnivan was
questioned and ans\·:ered as follows (R.
34, 35):

Q.

And what did your father say?

A.
He asked him if he had threatened
me, and he said, 'Yes.'

Q.

What else was said?

A. Wally said something about
that daddy had let him down.

Q. That is Mr. Dunnivan who said
that your father had let him down?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What else was said?

A. That is all I can recall being
said.

- 15 Later in the cross examination Mrs.
Dunnivan was questioned and answered
as follows

(R. 43):

Q. Was there any threat to kill
you or to cause you any bodily
harm when the officers were there
at all, when the gun was displayed
for the first time?
A. Just in the fact that he
pulled the gun-Q.
--Now just answer my question.
You just tell me if there was any
oral threat?
A.

No, not that I remember.

On direct examination Mr. Davis
testified as follows

(R. 51) :

I walked over to him, and
then Peggy followed me, and then
the two Policemen followed me,
and Wally said, 'You doublecrossed me.' and I said, 'I would
never come between you two as
long as you didn't do any harm to
the family. ' and I says, 'You
threatened to kill my girl, didn't
you?' and he says, 'Yes,' that
he would.
This testimony was substantially repeated
\;h1 le

reconstructing the scene except

- 16 the words, "that he would" were left
out by Mr. Davis (R. 54).
On cross examination Mr. Davis
added, "I would" to what he earlier
testified

Dunnivan had answered when

asked if he had threatened Mrs. Dunnivan
{R. 56).

Mr. Davis answered "None,"

when asked, "Did you ever hear any
other threats at that time as he brought
the gun up off the floor in his left
hand?"
On direct examination Officer Hazel
testified as follows

(R. 73) :

And as I was entering the
house--Well, I remember Wally
Dunnivan says, 'you doublecrossed me, Mr. Davis.' and Mr.
Davis stated, he says, 'I told you,
Wally, that I would never interfere
with you as long as you didn't
do any harm to the family.' and
he says, 'and you threatened to
kill my daughter.' Here Mr.
Dunnivan says, at the same time
reaching down to the side of him,
he says,' Yes, I threatened to

- 17 kill her and I will do it,'
picking up the gun, and he
brought it above the table.
A few minutes later, while still
under direct examination, Officer Hazel
testified (R. 75):
When we walked in he had both
hands on the table, and he says,
'Yes, I said it, and I will,'
reaching down and he brought this
gun up bringing it across the
table like this (indicating).
On cross examination, the following
exchange took place between counsel and
Officer Hazel (R. 80, 81) :
Q. Now, I think you said that
the first conversation you heard
was Mr. Dunniva.n saying, 'You
double-crossed me Mr. Davis,' is
that right?
A.

Yes.

Q. And then Mr. Davis says, 'You
threatened to kill my daughter,
didn't you?'
Is that right?
A. Well, he said, 'I told you I
would never interfere.'
Q.
I'm sorry.
did he say?

And then what else

- 18 A.
He says, 'You threatened to
kill my daughter. '

Q. Now, was there anything else
said, other than that, at the time
Mr. Dunnivan reached down to pick
up the gun?
A.

Not that I am aware of.

Q.
Did you see whether the gun
was on the floor, or whether it
was on a chair?
A. When he reached down I looked
and the weapon was on the floor.

Q.
And then at that time, in
answer to Mr. Davis' question, you
said two different things at differen
times.
The first time you said Mr.
Dunnivan said, 'Yes, I threatened
to kill her, and I will do it,' is
that correct.
The next time you
'Yes, I did, and I will.'
Now, what did he say, exactly, if
you recall?
A.
He said, "Yes, I threatened
her and I will do it.'

Q.
And he didn't say,
and I will'?
A.

'Yes, I did,

Well, it was to that extent.

Q.

Do you remember the exact words,
or is that approximately what he
said?

A.

That is approximate.

- 19 Q.
It may have been just slightly
different, but that was the intent
of it, is that right?

A.

Yes.

On direct examination the following
testimony was given by Officer Hales
(R.

84,

85):

A. As we went into the house,
Mr. Davis was ahead of me, and
Dunnivan says, 'You doublecrossed me.' He says, 'Wally,'
he says, 'I told you'
Q.--Who said this?
A. Mr. Davis. He says, 'Wally,
I told you I would never interfere
in your affairs unless you hurt my
daughter or her family.'
It was
in words of that nature.
Q.

Then what happened?

A. Then he says, 'You threatened
to kill my daughter.'
Q.

Who said this?

A. Mr. Davis. Mr. Dunnivan said,
'Yes,' and he says, 'I will,' or
in words of this nature.
In reconstructing the scene while still

on direct, Officer Hales testified (R. 86):

- 20 A. Well, Mr. Davis says, 'I
promised you I would never
interfere as long as you did no
harm to my daughter of family.'
He says, 'You threatened to kill
her.'
And Mr. Dunnivan said,
'Yes, and I will do it," in words
of this nature. Whether they
are exact or not, I don't know.
On cross examination the following
exchange took place between counsel and
Officer Hales (R. 90) :
Q.
The first time you told us
what he said, you said, in answer
to Mr. Davis' question, apparently,
'Yes, I did, and I will.'
The next
time you said he said, 'Yes, and
I will do i t . '
Now, which did
he say?
A.
The statement I said was in
those words that, 'I will,' or
'I will do i t . '
Q.

Words to that effect?

A.

Yes.

Q.
It could be either one, is
that right?
A.
Yes.
of them,
Will. I

He could have used both
'I will do it,' or 'I

Q.
Did he make that statement
more than once?

- 21 A.

No.

Q. Was there anything else that
he said that you would have considered threatening in any way?
A.

No.

ARGUHENT
I.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY DENYING
THE DEFENSE'S .MOTION "TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT OF rrIIE PLAINTIFF FOR THE
REASON THAT THE COMPLAINT AS PREPARED,
AND THE EVIDENCE AS PRESENTED TO THE
COURT, FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIM_J\
FACIE CASE IN THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE COURT AT THAT
TIME, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLY
TO MR. DUNNIVAN, WITH ANY INTENT TO DO
BODILY HARM TO MRS. DUNNIVAN" (R. 91,
92, 136).
Was it possible, as a matter of
Law, for the court to say that from

the evidence given a jury could reasonably
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than that of the guilt of the defendant?
Obviously no assault took place
prior to Mrs. Dunnivan's going down
town with the Jenkins.

While there is

-
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evidence that he verbally threatened
her, there was no evidence that he had
any means of carrying out the threat.
The assault, if any, had to take
place after the return of Mrs. Dunnivan
with her father and the two police
officers.

At this point the defendant

was sitting in a chair at a table with
a loaded, but uncocked, single-shot gun
lying

on the floor.

He was confronted

by four standing adults, two of whom
were armed policemen,

and all apparently

within easy reaching distance of him.
The State contends he intended to shoot
Mrs. Dunnivan.

In order to complete

that act this right-handed man would
have had to pick up this gun with his
left hand, swing it past the two armed
policemen, cock, brace, aim and fire it;
and all this with the five small children

-
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of he and his inbended victim in the
next room.

Any J!n.rope of completing this

act would necessaKily be extremely
remote.

Any hope of escaping, even more

remote.

If the State reallX believed

the defendant was attempting to shoot
Mrs. Dunnivan undter these circumstances,
one wonders why

chose to prosecute him

rather than cornmitt him in the State
mental hospital.
To constitut::fe an assault, there
must be the commencement of an
act, which
not prevented,
would produce a battery. State
v. BlackwelL; 9 Ala. 79, State v.
Davis; 23
125 /35 Am. Dec.
735/;
on Criminal Law,
Waterman's N.otes, 282-83; Roscoe's
Criminal Ev£®ence, 287.
The
dra1.ving of a. pistol, without
£resenting or cocking it, is not
the comrnenceTinent of such an act.
Lawson v. the State, 30 Ala. 14
(1857).
In the presemt case the defendant
drew the gun up o£f the floor, but it
wac3 clearly estabJl..ished that the gun

- 24 -

was never presented, cocked or fired.
It may be that he would have presented,
cocked and fired it had it not been
taken away from him.

Nevertheless, the

gun was taken away from him (or he laid
it down as he contends) before he
presented, cocked or fired it.

As the

case stands, the minds of the jury would
have to
was.

as to what his intent

This right-handed man would have

had to fire with his left hand while
still seated and without bracing the
12-gage shot gun in a manner to absorb
the recoil.

The presence of the two

armed police officers cut off any hope
of escape as the gun was merely a single
shot and firing it would have left him
defenseless.

Is it not, therefore, more

reasonable or at least just as reasonable
to conclude that he merely intended to

- 25 -

frighten her, or question her about
the loaded gun being within reach of
the children?
LThere must be/ more than a
mere menace. -There may be
an intention to corrunit an
assault, there may be preparation, and there may be a
menace; but these are not
enough.
There must be an
effort put forth to carry the
intention into execution;
there must be an overt act.
State v. Huber, 148 P. 562,
It may be that he was attempting to
assault her but that is not what he
was charged with.

He was charged with

assaulting Peggy Dunnivan, not with
attempting to assault her.

See Perkins,

An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to
Assault, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 71, 77.
Corrunon experience tells us that
men frequently, when under the influence
particularly of passion, threaten to do
things which they never really intend to

- 26 do and s2y things which they really do
not mean.

Sports spectators frequently

yell "kill the Umpire" and other such
ominous words which would horrify them

if truly carried out.

Men frequently

invoke dam...!ation in Hell by Diety upon
persons whom they might be no more than
mildly vexed.

Surely then, the treatening

words, if any, of the defendant are not
sufficient to show he truly intended to
shoot or kill Mrs. Dunnivan.

In fact,

it is not clear that Mr. Dunnivan ever
did verbally threaten Mrs. Dunnivan
during the time he "had the present
ability" to carry out the threat--during
the time he had the gun.

He admitted

threatening her before she went down town
and the prosectuion's witnesses all
testified that he agreed that he had
t.hreatened her when asked by .Mr. Davis.

- 27 -

It is not at all clear, however,
that he verbally threatened her when she
returned with her father and the policemen
Mrs. Dunnivan stated that he did not.
Only the words "I would" which Mr. Davis
attributed to Mr. Dunnivan could be
construed to be any sort of verbal
threat found in Mr. Davis' testimony.
These words did not come in until the
third time Mr. Davis repeated this part
of his story.

Furthermore, these words

would otherwise not appear to be an exact
quotation of Mr. Dunnivan as he was
asked if he had threatened Mrs. Dunnivan.
The answer, "Yes, I would," is hardly
responsive.

It is more probable that

Mr. Dunnivan said, "Yes, I did," as he
claims.
Only the police officers--the ones
leasL likely to hear as they were just

- 28 walking into the house at the time, and
the least likely to remember because
they were not the ones being threatened-claim to have heard anything that could
really be considered a threat.

These

officers, however, admitted that they
did not remember his exact words and
were only giving his "approximate" words
(R. 80) or "words of this nature"
86) or "words to that effect"

(R. 85,

(R. 90).

It is submitted that the evidence
as to verbal threats at the time Mr.
Dunnivan had the gun is not sufficiently
strong to allow a jury to conclude
beyond all reasonable doubt that Mr.
Dunnivan verbally threatened Mrs. Dunnivan
at a time when he had the present ability
to carry out the treat.
It is submitted that the gun was
laid down, surrendered or taken away

- 29 before it beca.rne clear what he intended
to do with it.
A case which is somewhat analogous
to this case is State v.
95 Utah 541, 8e P. 2nd 261, 262 (1938}.
In the Mortensen case, the defendant
with money, candy and promises of more
money, induced two young girls each about
10 years old to meet him in a secluded
place where he induced one to "ditch"
the other and then requested the remaining
girl to "have fun

11

with him including

kissing and hugging.

The little girl

testified:
He said, 1 You sit down.'
I
wouldn't do it; he started to
slide over toward me, and I
moved back.
I said, "What
are you going to do?' He
said, "Just have a little fun,
and if I hurt you I will give
you a quarter and you can go
home.'
While still in the process of soliciting

- 30 the little girl, hut while still three
feet away from her, the defendant's
efforts were interrupted by the girl's
father who had been summoned to the
scene by

friends who had detected

the defendant's apparent attempted
seduction.
This court reversed the conviction
of Mortensen for attempt to commit rape.
In doing so this court stated:
While the jury had the advantage
of witnesses' demeanor, there is
nothing in the record nor could
there be anything in the demeanor
which would indicate what
defendant really intended to do.
The fact that he contemplated he
might "hurt" her does not show
that he intended to commit rape
because he could have hurt her by
taking indecent liberties.
If,
however, he had without words
approached her with his penis
exposed, or indicated by other
acts that he intended to have
intercourse with her, the jury
could have inferred from his acts
the intent. But as the case stands
the minds of the jury would have
to speculate as to what his intent

31 -

was.
It is not the case of
permitting the jury to select
inferences where one or more
inferences might be drawn.
In
this case there is a dark area
through which the mind of the
jury must proceed from the evidence
to a conclusion which makes such
conclusion not one resulting from
an inference but one resulting
from a guess or speculation.
To adopt the example this court used in
Mortensen to this case, if Mr. Dunnivan

had stood with gun cocked, braced, and
aimed

ready to fire as Mrs.

entered the door, or haa he laid the gun

on the floor in a manner which would
have allowed him to pick it up with his
right hand and had he then cocked it as
he raised it and aimed it, or perhaps
if he had even cocked the gun as he
picked it up off the floor with his left
hand, "the jury could have inferred from
his acts the intent" to shoot her.

"But

as the case stands the jury would have
t ,,

speculate as to what his intent was."

-
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Therefore, Appellant respectfully
submits that the court should find that
the court below erred in denying the
defense's motion "to dismiss the complaint
of plaintiff for the reason that the
complaint as prepared, and the evidence
as presented to the court, failed to
establish a prima facie case in that
there was no evidence which would justify
the court at the time, viewing the
evidence most favorably to Mr. Dunnivan,
with any intent to do any bodily harm
to Mrs. Dunnivan"

(R. 91).

II.
THE DEFINITION OF 11 CONSIDERABLE
PROVOCATION" GIVEN IN INSTRUCTION NO.
8 AS "THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS OR CIRCUMS'l'ANCES AS WOULD CAUSE A REASONABLE
PRUDENT PERSON UNDER LIKE FACTS AND
SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE TO
EXERCISE AN UNCONTROLLABLE RAGE, FEAR,
ANXIETY, OR EXCITEi-!ENT, SO THAT HE ACTS
SOLELY UNDER AND BY REASON OF SUCH
RAGE,
ANXIETY, OR EXCITEMENT,
REASONABLY INDUCED BY SUCH PROVOCATION"
IS DEFECTIVE.

-
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The defendant testified of several
matters--the repossession of the vehicles
and Mrs. Dunnivan's apparent lack of
concern about it, his learning of other
unpaid bills, and finally the discovery
of a loaded shot gun within reach of his
small children--which culminated in his
being " ... so mad

now that I am fixing

to blow my stack ....

I was so mad

couldn't see straight."

I

(R. 104).

He testified of his resentment
toward his former father-in-law because
of his repeated intervention in the
Dt.1univan's marital disputes (R. 106).
Seeing Mr. Davis corning into the house
further provoked him.
couldn't even talk"

"I was so mad I

(R. 110).

The jury should have been instructed
thzi.lby "considerable provocation" is meant
the existence of facts or circumstances

-
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as would cause the defendant, Wallace
Dunnivan, to

an uncontrollable

rage, fear, anxiety, or excitement,
reasonably

by such provocation.

This view is suppoirted in Williams,
Provocation and t:l!ne Reasonable Man,
( 19 5 4)

Crim. L. :rnev. 7 4 0, 7 41-7 4 2, 7 51-

752:
It is, however, an easy transition
from saying that the law makes
reasonable aJl.lowance for provocation to saying that the test
of provocat.iDn is the behaviour
of the reasomable or ordinary man
Plausible as this formulation
may appear,
creates a serious
problem.
Im the law of contract
and torts, amrid elsewhere in the
criminal laWi,, the test of the
reasonable man indicates an ethical
standard; buft it seems absurd
to say that the reasonable man
will commit a felony the possible
punishment for which is imprisonment for life.
To say that the
'ordinary' mran will commit this
felony is
less absurd.
The reason \Why provoked homicide
is punished is to deter people
from committing the offence; and

-
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it is curious confession of
failure on tfae part of the law
to suppose that, notwithstanding
the possibiLit.y of heavy punishment, an ordinary person will
commit it.
If the assertion were
correct, it i:-w·-ould raise serious
doubts whether the offence should
continue to be punished.
Surely the true view of provocation
is that it is a concession to
the frailty
human nature' in
those except£nnal cases where the
legal
fails of effect.
It is a comprromise, neither
conceding the propriety of the
act nor exacting the full
penalty for
This being so,
how can it be admitted that
that paragoru of virtue, the
reasonable man, gives way to
provocation? •..
A curious errr.or or reasoning
seems to have been committed by
some judges Ln supporting the
reasonable-marn test.
In Lesbini
(1914) e K.B;. 1116, Avory, J.,
in support of the rule that mental
unbalance was irrelevant, said
that is the Raw where otherwise a
bad-tempered man would be entitled
to a verdict of man-slaughter
where a good-tempered one would
be liable to be conviceted of
murder.
Other judges supported
the reasonah.TI_e-man test before
the Royal
of Capital
Punishment f<rDr the same reason,
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and with some hesitation the
Commission accepted the argument
(Cmd. 8932, para. 139-45). However, reflection will perhaps
show that the argument is
mistaken. Even under the law as
it stands, a bad-tempered man may
be entitled to be acquitted of
murder where a good-tempered one
may be liable to be convicted ....
Ever since the time of East the
legal requirement has been that
the accused should have acted
in the heat of passion or in blind
ragei and the question whether he
acted in this way or with cool
calculation is one of fact.
This
rule, which has never been questioned,
does, therefore, discriminate between
good-tempered and bad-tempered men,
to the advantage of the latter.
The only way of removing from the
law the privilege given by bad
temper would be by abolishing the
law of provocation:
for goodtempered men are never provoked to
kill. The good-tempered man may,
of course, kill from a motive of
gain or other profit, but by
definition he does not kill from
bad temper, which is the only sort
of killing with which provocation
deals.
Instructing the jury to consider what
would provoke Mr. Dunnivan seems particularly appropriate in this case where Mrs.

- 37 Dunnivan had lived with Mr. Dunnivan
for many years.
short temper

She surely knew of his

and what would provoke

him and, therefore, could have and
should have avoided provoking him.
Therefore, Appellant respectfully
submits that the court should find that
instruction No. 8 is defective in that
it defines "considerable provocation"
as meaning "the existence of facts or
circumstances as would cause a reasonable
and prudent person under like facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence to
exercise an uncontrollable rage, fear,
anxiety, or excitement, so that he acts
solely under and by reason of such rage,
fear, anxiety, or excitement, reasonably
induced by such provocation;" and that
the court should reverse the conviction
of the Appellant and remand the case to
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the court below with instructions to
grant a new trial and avoid the prejudicial errors of the previous trial.
III.
NO. 8 DOES NOT FAIRLY
AND ACCURATELY REPRESENT TH:C LAW
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE, IN THAT THERE
HAS NO EVIDENCE OF lu"J AB.Ai."'JDONED OR
MALIGNANT HEART AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GIVING OF THIS PARTICULAR
INS'l'RUC'l'ION WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO
THE APPELLANT'S POSITION AND CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

Not only was there no evidence of
an abandoned or malignant heart, there
was in fact evidence that the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of the
incident in question (R. 23) .

If in

fact he was intoxicated, he may have
been "unable to comprehend his duty to
govern his actions in accord with the
duty imposed by law ....
64 Cal.

11

People v. Conley

2d 310, 411 P. 2d 911 (1966).

Therefore, Appellant respectfully
submits that instruction no. 8 does not

-
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fairly and accurately represent the
law applicable in the case, in that there
was no evidence of an abandoned or

iI

malignant heart and under the circumstance
the giving of this particular instruction
was highly prejudicial to the Appellant's
position and contrary to the evidence in
the case.

Therefore, Appellant is

entitled to a new trial.
IV.
rrHE EVIDENCE AS RECEIVED BY THE
COURT BELOW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TH
GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AS THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE OF AN UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT.
Any argument on this point would be
repetitious of argument given in I above.
That argument is, therefore, adopted here
and the point submitted.
V.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS CONFUSING AND
DOES NOT CORRECTLY AND ACCURATELY STATE
THE OBLIGATION OF THE JURY IN DETER!'1INING
THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT,
AND MERELY STATES THAT THE JURY IS TO
FIRST DETERMINE THE GUILT OF THE CRir1E OF
ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON WITH INTENT
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TO DO BODILY HARM. THIS INSTRUCTION SHOUL
HAVE BEEN PREFACED WITH AN INSTRUCTION OR
OBSERVATION THAT THE DEFENDANT AT ALL
TIMES IS PRESUMED TO BE INNOCENT OF THE
1
CRIME IN ANY DETERMINATION OR DELIBERATION
BY THE JURY. THE INSTRUCTION, AS GIVEN,
IS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND CONTRARY TO THE
LAW.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled to have his
conviction vacated and the case remanded
for retrial with appropriate supplemental
instructions to avoid the errors complained of herein.
Respectfully submitted,

LORIN R. BLAUER
Attorney at Law
315 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for DefendantAppel lant, Dunnivan

